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Abstract: This paper adopts a comparative, corpus-based perspective to 
examine the language of judicial justification. Based on substantial corpus 
data, the study explores one of the linguistics resources, i.e. head nouns (e.g. 
assumption, belief, notion, etc.) followed by a nominal complement in the 
form of that-clause in two comparable legal settings: the opinions given in 
the United States Supreme Court and the judgements handed down by 
Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal. The findings corroborate the results of 
previous research which shows that nouns found in this pattern are used to 
perform various discourse functions but evaluation plays a central role in 
judicial writing and these nouns are used to signal sites of contentions. The 
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study reveals the general similarity between the two sets of data suggesting 
that American and Polish judicial writing is underpinned by essentially the 
same epistemological assumptions. Yet, there are some differences in the 
way the nouns behave phraseologically. Polish nouns tend to show less 
collocational variation and they are found performing fewer discourse 
functions. 
 
Key words: evaluation, stance, judicial discourse, legal justification, US 
Supreme Court, Constitutional Tribunal 
 
Streszczenie: Niniejszy artykuł ukazuje próbę wykorzystania metodologii 
korpusowej w celu badania języka uzasadnien decyzji stosowania prawa. 
Przedmiotem analizy jest użycie grupy rzeczowników takich jak 
przypuszczenie, pogląd czy sugestia w konstrukcji przed spójnikiem that, a 
więc kontrolujących zdania podrzędne dopełnieniowe. Celem badania jest 
zbadanie funkcji jakie rzeczowniki w tej konstrukcji pełnią w dyskursie 
uzasadnień sądowych. Przyjęta hipoteza zakładała, że jedną z funkcji może 
być wartościowanie. Przedstawione w artykule wyniki potwierdzają, że 
sędziowie, zarówno amerykańscy jak i polscy, posługują się chętnie tego 
typu wyrażeniami w celu dokonania oceny argumentów zgłoszonych przez 
sędziów rozpatrujących sprawę w niższej instancji, strony procesowe, jak 
również innych sędziów spośród składu orzekającego. Bliższa analiza 
ukazuje również, iż rzeczowniki użyte w uzasadnieniach Trybunału 
Konstytucyjnego charakteryzują się mniejszym zróżnicowaniem 
kolokacyjnym oraz pełnią mniej funkcji w dyskursie niż ich angielskie 
odpowiedniki. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: dyskurs sądowy, wartościowanie, uzasadnienie, Sąd 
Najwyższy Stanów Zjednoczonych, Trybunał Konstytucyjny 
1. Introduction 
Apart from making their decisions, judges need to present 
them in a way that appears fair and objective to all the parties 
involved as well as to the general public. Justifying a decision seems 
to be almost as important as the decision itself. And the decisions 
made by judges often have enormous and far-reaching consequences 
in people’s lives. This paper is concerned with how judges justify their 
decisions and in doing so how they construct their reasoning. As 
DiMatteo argues (2015: 513), it is not easy to grasp the ”causal 
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relationship between judicial reasoning and the justification given for 
judicial decisions”. One aspect shared by both legal argumentation 
and justification inevitably involves evaluation. In their 
argumentation, judges, especially in appellate courts, assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of arguments advanced by various legal 
actors: lower court judges, procecution, legal counsel, their fellow 
judges, etc. depending on the type of court and jurisdiction. In doing 
so they express their stances and align themselves with other 
institutional interactants. The language that they use to accomplish 
this task reveals the epistemological beliefs and values of their 
professional community as well as their personal system of values. 
This area of specialist language use in institutional settings is 
signficant and highly relevant to professional practice but at the same 
time it is complex and methodologically problematic. Its actual verbal 
realizations can be extremely complex and often elusive since 
evaluative meanings are expressed overtly or they can be 
communicated implicitly by relying on shared values and knowledge. 
The linguistic aspects of evaluation are most often subsumed 
within such concepts as appraisal (Martin and White 2005), evaluation 
(Hunston and Thompson 2000) or stance (e.g. Biber et al. 1999). In 
this paper I rely on the concepts of evaluation and stance seen from 
the perspective of Corpus Linguistics methodology in order to explore 
linguistic resources employed to express evaluation. While there is 
growing literature on evaluation and stance in the context of a single 
legal system and language, there is still relatively little research 
contributing to our uderstanding of how evaluation is done across 
different legal systems, cultures and languages. This paper reports 
findings which are part of a larger project which aims at describing the 
construal of evaluative language in judicial language across different 
legal languages and cultures. It identifies ways in which evaluations 
are formulated that are characteristic of judicial opinions in general 
rather than with regard to individual and idiosyncratic modes of 
expression. In this study I address this issue by considering one of the 
linguistics resources, i.e. head nouns (e.g. assumption, belief, notion, 
etc.) followed by a nominal complement in the form of that-clause in 
two comparable legal settings: the opinions given in the United States 
Supreme Court and the judgements handed down by Poland’s 
Constitutional Tribunal. Previous research shows that nouns found in 
this pattern are used to perform various discourse functions but 
evaluation plays a central role in judicial writing and these nouns are 
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used to signal sites of contentions, i.e. challenged propositions are 
likely to be labelled as arguments, assumptions, notions or 
suggestions (Goźdź-Roszkowski and Pontrandolfo 2013; Goźdź-
Roszkowski forth.). This paper aims to test this hypothesis further by 
examining the phraseological behaviour of selected nouns in the 
N+that grammar pattern in American and Polish judicial discourse. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section explains 
the key concepts of evaluation and stance and it briefly summarizes 
existing research into how these linguistic concepts have been applied 
to study judicial discourse. Section 3 is concerned with the 
institutional contexts of the United States Supreme Court and the 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal. This section also shows the 
macrostructures of a US judicial opinion and a Polish judgment in 
order to further contextualize legal reasoning and justification as these 
are embedded within the respective documents. Section 4 presents 
corpora and the method employed throughout the analysis. This is 
followed by Results and Discussion and Conclusions. 
2. Evaluation and Stance and their Applications in 
Judicial Discourse 
As already indicated, evaluation is at the heart of judicial 
reasoning and justification. Indicating an attitude towards a legal 
entity, process or interactant is inherent in the acts of persuasion and 
argumentation, both being an integral part of judicial discourse. A 
substantial part of judicial opinions involves expressing agreement or 
disagreement with decisions given by lower courts, opinions 
expressed by counsel representing the parties, as well as the opinions 
arrived at by fellow judges from the same bench. Evaluation is the 
engine of persuasion (Partington et al., 2013: 46) and judges have to 
persuade that their grounds are right or that the arguments adduced by 
the defendants or their counsel are wrong. In doing so, they inevitably 
resort to assessing the merits of arguments they are asked to examine. 
In the science of linguistics, the term evaluation is usually understood 
as. 
 
‘the broad cover term for the expression of the speaker or 
writer’s attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings 
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about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about. 
That attitude may relate to certainty or obligation or 
desirability or any of a number of other sets of values’ 
(Thompson and Hunston 2000: 5) 
 
More specifically, evaluation can be characterised as 
representing types of meaning that tend to be ‘subjective’ or 
‘attitudinal’, and that may be distinguished from the ‘objective’ or 
‘factual’. In the context of judicial argumentation, evaluation can 
represent an individual position of a single judge (in a dissenting or 
concurring opinion), the position of a whole court or the majority of 
judges in a given case. Evaluation is most often used to express a user 
orientation (it is the user who evaluates) but it also focuses on “values 
ascribed to the entities and propositions which are evaluated” 
(Thompson and Hunston 2000: 5). On the other hand, the concept of 
stance or stance-taking (du Bois 2007), construes an action (taking 
stance) rather than an entity. The act of (dis)alignment between 
interactants is perhaps of greater importance (Goźdź-Roszkowski & 
Hunston 2016). Viewed against the backdrop of judicial discourse, the 
judge who takes a stance construes a relationship between themselves 
and an external entity and simultaneously between themselves and 
other legal interactant(s), such as other judges from the same bench, 
lower court judges, counsel, defence counsel, attorney general, etc. 
It should be noted that the study of evaluation or stance poses 
some methodological problems. On the one hand, evaluation may be 
expressed overtly or explicitly, using recognisably evaluative lexis 
and/or constructions associated with evaluation, but on the other hand, 
evaluative meaning might be ‘evoked’ by examining its context. In 
this study, I adopt a corpus-bases approach to the study of evaluation 
or stance in judicial discourse. This involves checking the corpus data 
for specific words and phrases that inscribe an attitude or stance 
towards an entity in the text. 
The study of evaluative meanings in judicial discourse is still 
in its infancy. Some recent corpus-based studies include Heffer 
(2007), Mazzi (2008), Mazzi (2010), Finegan (2010), Szczyrbak 
(2014), Goźdź-Roszkowski & Pontrandolfo 2013). Szczyrbak 
examines stancetaking strategies in a corpus of US Supreme Court 
opinions. The analysis is informed by du Bois’s (2007) interactional 
concept of stance and the two related notions of epistemicity and 
evidentiality. Both Mazzi (2008) and Finegan (2010) examine the use 
of adverbials of stance in judicial discourse. The former study focuses 
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on selected eight stance adverbs (e.g. apparently, clearly, etc.) 
analyzed in a corpus of 98 equity judgments of the Chancery Division 
of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales. In the latter, 
Finegan (2010) examines judicial attitude by focusing on adverbial 
expressions of attitudinal stance and emphasis. Heffer (2007) draws 
upon the systematic-functional lexical-semantic appraisal framework 
of judgment (Martin and White 2005) to examine the linguistic 
construal of evaluating witnesses and defendants by trial lawyers and 
judges. In doing so, Heffer investigates a large corpus of official court 
transcripts. Mazzi (2010) views evaluation as a deep structure and a 
prominent aspect of the way in which judges construct their 
argumentative positions (p.374). In his corpus-based study, Mazzi 
investigates evaluative lexis in the judicial discourse of US Supreme 
Court written opinions. By focusing on the single discourse element of 
‘this/these/that/those + the labelling noun’, he provides some corpus 
evidence to demonstrate that abstract nouns such as, for example, 
attitude, difficulty, process, reason, etc. have both encapsulating and 
evaluative function when found in this pattern in the judicial opinions. 
Goźdź-Roszkowski & Pontrandolfo (2013) and Goźdź-Roszkowski 
(2018) belong to those very few studies that begin to explore 
evaluation from a cross-language perspective. The present study 
continues to explore this research direction. 
3. Institutional Context: United States Supreme Court 
and Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal 
Despite the obvious differences between the Common Law 
and the Continental Civil Law, the Supreme Court in the United States 
and the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland share some similarities with 
respect to their roles and functions. The US Supreme Court is the 
highest court in the United States. It consists of the Chief Justice and 
eight Associate Justices who are nominated by the president and 
confirmed by the Senate. Its primary task is to exercise appellate 
jurisdiction and to serve as the final arbiter in the construction of the 
Constitution of the United States by providing a uniform interpretation 
of the law. Appellants must file a petition for writ of certiorari, i.e. 
they ask the Court to hear their appeal. The certiorari can be either 
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granted or denied. If it is granted, the Court will deliver one of the 
following opinions: per curiam opinion (unanimous), majority 
(opinion shared by the majority), plurality (final outcome agreed to by 
majority but for differing reasons). Individual judges (referred to as 
justices) can also write their separate opinions, which are either 
concurring (agreeing with the majority decision for different reasons) 
or dissenting opinion (disagreeing with the majority). It is not possible 
to appeal from a S.C. decision. The decisions are binding in all 




Poland's court system is a complex four-level hierarchy with 
regional, district, appellate and the highest court. The Constitutional 
Tribunal (Pol. Trybunał Konstytucyjny) stands apart from this 
hierarchy resolving disputes related to the constitutionality of actions 
undertaken by public institutions and its main task is to ensure the 
compliance of statutory law with the Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland. The Constitution of 2 April 1997 recognizes four areas of the 
Constitutional Tribunal's jurisdiction: 
1) the review of norms (both abstract and specific; a posteriori 
and a priori - a particular procedure for reviewing the norms is 
adjudicating on constitutional complaints;  
2) settling disputes over authority between the central 
constitutional organs of State; 
3) determining whether purposes or activities of political 
parties are in conformity with the Constitution; 
4) determining whether or not there exists an impediment to 
the exercise of the office by the President of the Republic. 
One feature that is shared by both the US Supreme Court 
opinions and the judgments given by the Constitutional Tribunal is the 
focus on justifications used in the judicial decision-making. In terms 
of textual space, legal justification is located in the opinion part of the 
courts decisions. Opinions delivered by the Supreme Court of the 
United States (SC) generally consist of four major parts (Brostoff and 
Sinsheimer 2003): (1) Headnote – which includes the names of the 
parties, identification of parties (their role in the proceedings, i.e. 
petitioner, respondent), an identification of the court in which the 
recorded case was heard, and the date of the opinion, (2) Procedural 
                                                          
1
 This part of the paper is based on Lee et al. 1999 and the US Supreme Court 
website www.supremecourt.gov 
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History – this section contains a brief description of how the lower-
instance courts dealt with the case. It usually includes the basis for 
review, i.e. the reasons why the Supreme Court heard the case; (3) 
Holding - invariably signalled by the use of the word held, this section 
provides the decision (ruling) reached by the Supreme Court in a 
particular case ended with a disposition of the case (e.g. affirmed, 
vacated and remanded); (4) Opinion – unlike the previous sections 
which are usually prepared by a court clerk, this final part is authored 
by individual judges and it includes judicial argumentation provided 
in order to justify the decision reached by the court. It explains the law 
as applied to the case and provides the reason on the basis of which 
the decision is made. 
The macrostructure of a Constitutional tribunal judgment is to 
some extent similar. It consists of a headnote (Pol. komparycja), tenor, 
which contains a disposition of the case, i.e. the court’s decision 
(roughly, this part corresponds to holding in S.C. opinions) and 
justification of judgments. Justifications given by the Constitutional 
Tribunal have a fixed structure which consists of three parts. First, 
there is a historical part (część historyczna) which refers to all the 
documents pertinent to a given case. In this part, the contents of an 
application (petition) and its basis are described. This part also 
provides the details of a charge and the challenged regulation as well 
as the positions taken by each of the interactants (parties to the 
proceedings) along with their most important arguments. The second 
part called ”at the trial” (na rozprawie) reports all material 
circumstances which occurred between the first court hearing and the 
verdict. The third part focuses on the admissibility of a petition (ocena 
dopuszczalności wniosku), a specific constitutional issue, reviewing 
standards (wzorzec kontroli), relevance of the grounds for an 
application (ocena zasadności wniosku), etc. Finally, separate 
opinions (if any) are provided. 
4. Material and Method 
This study is based on two collections of data. The first one 
consists of 113 different opinions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States totaling 1,333,320 words and randomly sampled from the 
period between 1999 and 2015 via FindLaw.com, a well-known legal 
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information web portal providing free access to cases heard by the US 
Supreme Court. The Polish data comprises 95 different judgments 
handed down by the Constitutional Tribunal between 2001 and 2015. 
The texts, which contain 1,303,141 words, were collected from the on-
line database Internetowy Portal Orzeczeń, available at 
http://ipo.trybunal.gov.pl. 
In this study, I adopted a method whereby a targeted search is 
based on a grammar pattern: a grammar pattern of nouns followed by 
the appositive that-clause as the core item. Prior to the analysis, the 
corpus of US opinions was POS tagged using Wmatrix software 
(Rayson 2008) and the sequence NOUN + that was searched. The 
search was limited to nouns that occur at least 5 times per 1,000,000 
words. The retrieved instances were then manually checked to ensure 
that the nouns are indeed followed by an appositive that-clause and 
not by the relative pronoun that (see Hunston & Francis 2000: 98–99). 
Additionally, each noun had to be found in at least five different 
opinions in an attempt to reduce bias resulting from judges’ 
idiosyncratic style of writing. As the next step, I selected four nouns 
for further study and these are argument, assumption, view and notion. 
Previous research (Goźdź-Roszkowski & Pontrandolfo 2013; Goźdź-
Roszkowski forth.) suggests that these nouns are marked for their high 
evaluative potential in judicial writing and the nouns are used to signal 
what could be called ‘sites of contentions’, i.e. judges tend to select 
certain stance nouns to challenge propositions they deal with in ther 
argumentation. 
In order to address the question whether the same discursive 
regularity occurs in Polish judicial texts, four corresponding Polish 
nouns were selected: argument, założenie, pogląd, and twierdzenie. 
The Polish nouns were selected as prima facie dictionary equivalents 
using the English-Polish Dictionary PWN-Oxford (Linde-
Usiekniewicz 2004). This stage of analysis involved carrying out a 
targeted search (using the WordSmith Tools 5.0) for all instances of 
these nouns (including their declensional variants, i.e. argument 
argumentu, argumentem, etc.) in the text corpus. The retrieved 
instances were then manually checked to ensure that the nouns are 
indeed found in the comparable grammar pattern whereby the nouns 
are followed by że or iż (the complementizer that in English 
corresponds to two variants in Polish: że and iż). The next stage 
involved scrutinising concordance lines centered around the four 
nouns in order to identify their collocational patterns. The obtained 
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co-occurrence patterns were interpreted in functional terms. Sentence 
examples in Polish were glossed in English. The translation is literal 
and it only covers those relevant parts in which a particular phrase is 
found. 
5. Results and discussion 
argument that and argument, że 
I first turn to examine the English data and start with the noun 
argument. Not surprisingly, this noun is very frequent in judicial 
argumentation. It appears 141 times per milion words in the corpus of 
Supreme Court opinions and barely 12.4 times per milion words in the 
academic section of the Corpus of Contemporary American English.  
In the largest (35%) proportion of all the instances when argument 
that is found in the corpus of US S.C. opinions, it co-occurs with 
value-laden language items representing different parts of speech. 
(1) This Court finds unpersuasive the argument that, even with 
those limits, par. 2(B) must be held preempted at this stage.  
(2) Petitioner’s argument that a sanction order is effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment suffers from at 
least two flaws 
(3) The availability of state judicial review defeats the 
Government’s argument that , absent EPA’s oversight, there 
is a legal vacuum where BACT decisions are not subject to 
review. 
What is common to the three sentence examples shown as 
excerpts 1-3 is their evaluative function. The evaluation is expressed 
either by attributing it to a specific legal actor, usually it is the court 
en bloc, as in example (1) or it is averred by individual judges as in (2) 
and (3). While arguments remain the target of evaluation, the legal 
actors who advance them are often identified (e.g. petitioner’s 
argument that, Government’s argument that). Such evaluation is 
expressed overtly and it is usually negative. Judges also express their 
stance by indicating whether they accept or reject a given argument. 
This function is realized through a much more restricted lexis but it is 
also very common. 
(4) We do not accept, furthermore, respondents’ argument that 
laches should apply because the motions filed by the 
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Government following the District Court’s denial of its 
motion to dismiss amounted to little more than dilatory tactics 
to ”delay and obstruct the proceedings.” 
Characteristically, the negative stance in a majority opinion is 
either averred by the judges and signalled through the use of the 
collective ‘we’ or attributed as in example (5): 
(5) The court considered and rejected the State’s argument that 
Sylvia’s statement was reliable because it coincided with 
petitioner’s to such a degree that the two ”interlocked”. 
In most cases, arguments are ascribed to specific parties 
and/or legal actors. In sum, judicial stances and evaluations are 
present in over 70% of all the instances when argument is used in the 
opinions. In the remaining cases, judges refer to arguments as the 
basis or cause for argumentation (13%). Arguments are also 
confirmed (7%) and indicated as existing or not (9%). Examples 6-8 
illustrate these uses: 
(6) While Stumpf’s mitigation case was premised on the 
argument that Stumpf had not shot Mrs Stout, that was fully 
consistent with his plea of guilty to aggravated murder.  
(7) Standing alone, the subsection supports the Commissioner’s 
argument that a signatory operator is necessarily a member 
of a group of corporations that includes itself. 
(8) First, there is the argument that par. 4001(a) does not even 
apply to wartime military detentions.  
I now turn to examine data related to the corresponding Polish 
phrase argument, że. There are 30 occurrences of this phrase in the 
Polish corpus. The co-texts of both argument that and argument, że 
share a similarity in that both phrases tend to be used to assess the 
argumentation of parties and legal actors. In almost half (14) of all the 
instances, propositions labelled as arguments are overtly evaluated as 
shown in examples 9-11. 
(9) Nietrafny jest również argument, że sądy nadały 
zaskarżonym przepisom treści normatywne niezgodne z art. 
64 ust. 2 w związku z art. 2 Konstytucji. [The argument that is 
… incorrect]. 
(10) Minister Finansów podkreślił bezzasadność 
argumentu, że kwota oszczędności wynikających z 
niepodwyższenia płac sędziów jest minimalna. [The Finance 
Minister stressed that the argument that is … groundless]. 
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(11) Tym samym Trybunał uznaje za nieuzasadniony 
argument Prezydenta RP, że kwotowa metoda waloryzacji 
podważa celowość podjętych w przeszłości inicjatyw przez 
świadczeniobiorców.  
The evaluative lexis is however much more restricted in 
Polish judgments than in American opinions. In the former, arguments 
are usually assessed using a value-laden adjective signalling that a 
given argument is either justified or not. This is in line with 
Królikowski’s (2015) observation that the language of justification in 
Constitutional Tribunal judgments is is becoming increasngly 
standardized. Another point of similarity is that the evaluation is either 
averred by the judges as in (9) or it is attributed to a specific legal 
actor (10) or the court en bloc (example 11). The other use of 
argument, że (with 5 occurrences) is axiologically neutral and it 
introduces an argument of another legal actor or a petitioner 
(wnioskodawca). In example 12 below, the Speaker ofthe Sejm 
(Poland’s lower house of parliament) puts forward an argument as one 
of the parties to the legal proceedings. 
2
 
(12) Marszałek podniósł argument, że mimo iż obecnie 
brzmienie ustawy o świadczeniach rodzinnych w większym 
stopniu realizuje ten postulat, to nie można uznać, że 
dotychczasowa regulacja prowadziła do rzeczywistego, i to 
niezależnego od postępowania osób zainteresowanych, 
naruszenia ich praw wynikających z art. 69 Konstytucji. 
[Speaker of the Sejm put forward the argument that …]. 
Some arguments may also be called upon to introduce 
different voices into a legal argumentation, some of which may not be 
directly involved as parties. Example (13) shows how an argument 
comes from the community of prosecutors. Such argumentation serves 
the purpose of strengthening legal justification contained in the 
judgment. 
(13) To ze strony środowiska prokuratorskiego podnoszony 
jest argument, że inne środki o charakterze nie izolacyjnym - 
zwłaszcza wobec oskarżonych o najpoważniejsze 
przestępstwa - cechuje z ich natury realna słabość i 
                                                          
2
 The presence of the Speaker is very common in proceedings before the 
Constitutional Tribunal given that one of the main competences of the 
Tribunal is to examine the constitutionality of legislative acts.  
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nieskuteczność [It is the prosecutors who raise the argument 
that …]. 
Just as their American counterparts, the Tribunal’s judges also 
signal their stance by rejecting or accepting arguments but there are 
only two occurrences of this use. 
(14) W tej sytuacji należy odrzucić argument, że opłaca 
się reakcja ustawodawcza nawet przy nikłym statystycznie 
zjawisku, jeśli można w ten sposób uzyskać lepszy efekt 
merytoryczny. [one should reject the argument that…]. 
 
assumption that and założenie, że 
In general English, the noun assumption is usually used to 
signal likelihood (Biber et al. 1999: 648 – 651). In the corpus of S.C. 
opinions it occurs twice as frequently as in the academic section of 
COCA (42.7 and 20.5 time per milion words, respectively). The 
analysis shows that judges tend to use assumption that to express two 
major discourse functions. The largest proportions of instances (56%) 
where this phrase is found is used to indicate causal relations. More 
specifically, assumptions are often construed as foundations for other 
propositions. This use is reflected in the strong co-occurrence between 
assumption that and the preposition on. Indeed, the phrase frame on + 
an/that/ adjective + assumption accounts for half of all the instances of 
assumption that. Examples (15) and (16) illustrate this point: 
(15) But such a claim does not help the FCC, for relevant 
precedent makes clear that, when faced with ambiguity, we 
are to interpret statutes of this kind on the assumption that 
Congress intended to preserve local authority. 
(16) Justice Stevens’ contrary conclusion is predicated on 
the erroneous assumption that the ordinance proscribes large 
amounts of constitutionally protected and/or innocent conduct. 
In (15), the proposition marked as assumption serves to show 
the basis for statutory interpretation. It is worth noting that the larger 
co-text contains another epistemic noun claim used to assess and 
address an argumentative point (such a claim does not help the FCC). 
In a similar vein, in example (16) assumption is indicated as the basis 
for a conclusion made in a dissenting opinion of a Supreme Court 
judge. In addition, the assumption is immediately evaluated as 
erroneous but, arguably, the negative evaluation concerns also the 
conclusion made by the judge. His conclusion is linked directly to 
assumption, which indicates a weak epistemic status of this 
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proposition. Labelling the proposition as assumption amounts to 
evaluation because it aligns the proposition with a construed world in 
which it cannot be subjected to immediate verification (Goźdź-
Roszkowski 2018: 144). However, in most cases found in this 
category, assumption is referred to non-evaluatively as the basis for 
other propositions. The other sizeable functional category includes 
instances when assumptions are overtly evaluated (25%). This is 
illustrated in examples (16) and (17) below. 
(17) It is a naive assumption that the failure of a bill to 
make it out of committee, or to be adopted when reported to 
the floor, is the same as a congressional rejection of what the 
bill contained. 
(18) The commentary’s assumption that the terms 
”properly constituted” and ”regularly constituted” are 
interchangeable is beyond reproach. 
Other much less frequent functions include ‘result’, 
‘confirmation’ and ’existence’. When we turn to consider the co-texts 
of the Polish equivalent phrase założenie, że, it is easy to notice that 
this phrase is used in essentially the same manner. There are 66 
occurrences of this phrase in the corpus of Constitutional Tribunal 
judgments. Assumptions are referred to as basis or cause for other 
propositions in 51.5%) of the cases. This is illustrated by the 
following two examples. 
(19) Obliczenia te oparte są na założeniu, że z ok. 100 tys. 
osób deportowanych na obszary II Rzeczypospolitej wcielone 
do III Rzeszy, do chwili obecnej żyje ok. 6 tys. osób. [These 
calculations are based on the assumption that (…)]. 
(20) Zarzuty sądu pytającego są obecnie bezprzedmiotowe, 
gdyż jego argumentacja została oparta na założeniu, że 
niedopuszczalna jest sytuacja, w której ustawodawca 
pozbawił pewną grupę osób maksymalnie ukształtowanej 
ekspektatywy. [The charges put forward by the court are now 
pointless since its argumentation is based on the assumption 
that …]. 
In a small proportion of (7 out of 34) cases, assumptions are 
both indicated as basis for other propositions and overtly evaluated. 
This echoes the discursive practice demonstrated in the case of the 
corresponding expressions in the Supreme Court opinions. Note, for 
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example, how closely Example (21) corresponds to the sentence 
provided in (16) above: 
(21) Tak sformułowany zarzut opiera się jednak na 
błędnym założeniu, że obie grupy ubiegających się o 
zwolnienie z kosztów sądowych powinny mieć 
zagwarantowane prawo do dwukrotnego rozpatrzenia ich 
wniosków przez niezależne i niezawisłe sądy. [This charge is 
based on the erroneous assumption that …]. 
Propositions based on assumptions usually include zarzuty 
(charges), stanowisko (stance, position) and wywody (argument). In 
addition, what appears quite characteristic of Polish judicial writing is 
the use of assumptions as basis for marking logical relations between 
two propositions by stressing that a given proposition is the 
consequence or result of an assumption. This use found in 22.7% of 
all cases is usually expressed using the phraseological expression 
wyjść z założenia [make an assumption] but there are also other 
language items such as punkt wyjścia (point of departure) or the co-
occurring noun konsekwencja employed for the same purpose: 
(22) Trybunał wyszedł z założenia, wyrażanego w 
dotychczasowym orzecznictwie, że sposób określenia 
obowiązku w art. 84 Konstytucji został powierzony 
ustawodawcy zwykłemu. {The Tribunal made an assumption 
expressed in the existing judicature that …]. 
(23) Punktem wyjścia dla tych orzeczeń było założenie, że 
(…) [Lit. The point of departure for these rulings was the 
assumption that …]. 
Assumptions co-occurring with purely evaluative language 
items amount to 15% and they usually include value-laden negatively-
charged adjectives such as kontrfaktyczne, kontrowersyjne, 
nieprawdziwe, nieprawidłowe, nietrafne, sprzeczne, nie w pełni 
odpowiada rzeczywistości, etc. Excerpts 24 and 25 provide additional 
contexts: 
(24) Co najmniej kontrowersyjne jest dla mnie 
podstawowe założenie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, że 
moralność … [The Constitutional Tribunal’s assumption that 
… is controversial]. 
(25) W jego ocenie przepis ten przyjmuje kontrfaktyczne 
założenie, że nie został dokonany wybór sędziów, których 
kadencja upływa w roku 2015. 
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In sum, it appears that assumptions in both American and 
Polish judicial writing are used as prime vehicles for construing 
foundations and showing logical correlations (or their absence) in 
legal argumentation. In addition, they are often evaluated. 
 
view that and pogląd, że  
The phrase view that is yet another example of a noun which 
is by far more commonly employed in judicial discourse (75.7% 
words per 1 m words) than in academic discourse provided in the 
COCA (19.3 words per 1 m. words). In contrast to assumption that 
and argument that, there is no single dominant function associated 
with view that. Still, the largest proportion of all instances of view that 
co-occur with various linguistic manifestations of evaluation. 
Interestingly, unlike in the case of the nouns shown above, the 
evaluation tends to be neutral or positive: 
(26) To be sure, I find much to commend the view that the 
Establishment Clause… 
(27) Mills simply represented a straightforward application 
of our longstanding view that … 
In another 30% of cases, it emerges that views are used to 
signal stance by confirming or disconfirming them. This usually takes 
the form of accepting or rejecting them. 
(28) Recognizing this point, we previously rejected the 
view that a witness is not subject to confrontation if his 
testimony is ”inculpatory only when taken together with other 
evidence.” 
(29) Even if this history had some relevance, it would not 
support the view that Congress intended to insert a new value 
exception into the phrase ”on account of”. 
The analysis shows that stance-related and evaluative 
language can be found with view that in 64% of the cases. Clearly, not 
all views are imbued with evaluation. In 20% of the cases, judges 
preparing their opinions merely report on what other legal actors think 
with regard to a particular issue. 
(30) Finally, Wilson laid out his view that sovereignty was 
in fact not located in the States at all. 
(31) I recognize that some Members of the Court, now or 
in the past, have taken the view that the First Amendment 
simply does not permit Congress to legislate in this area. 
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This neutral use of view that has been labelled as ‘existence’ 
because views are indicated as existing and no indication of an 
author’s stance is provided. Example 31 shows how a judge in his 
dissenting opinion positions himself with regard to the argumentation 
put forward in the majority opinion. In the remaining 14% of the 
instances where view that is found in the corpus, it is indicated as 
cause or basis for some other proposition, e.g. a decision as in 
Example 32. 
(32) The Court’s decision to dismiss the writ of certiorari 
as improvidently granted presumably is motivated, at least in 
part, by the view that the jurisdictional issues presented by 
this case do not admit of an easy resolution. 
Turning now to the Polish counterpart, pogląd, że we first note 
its relatively high frequency of 241 instances. Interestingly, the phrase 
pogląd, że displays a consistent collocational behaviour. In as many as 
47 cases (19,5%) pogląd, że co-occurs with a single verb podzielać 
(share). It is usually an institutional entity that shares a given view. 
(33) Trybunał Konstytucyjny podziela wyrażony w 
doktrynie pogląd, że przystąpienie do organizacji 
międzynarodowej oznacza przekazanie przez właściwe organy 
krajowe kompetencji do wykonywania władzy w zakresie 
działalności organizacji na rzecz jej organów. [Constitutional 
Tribunal shares the view expressed in the jurisprudece that 
(…)] 
(34) Prokurator Generalny podzielił pogląd RPO, że pkt 
3.1.2 załącznika nr 1 nie spełnia konstytucyjnego warunku 
jego wydania (…). [Attorney General shared the view of the 
Ombudsman that …]. 
It is also the preferred way of signalling concurrence by 
individual judges in their separate opinions: 
(35) Podzielam pogląd, że w świetle orzeczenia w sprawie 
o sygn. K. 3/98, stanowi to wystarczający powód do 
stwierdzenia, że doszło do naruszenia zasad prawidłowej 
legislacji. [I share the view that (…)]. 
This concurring function is also realized by means of less 
frequent verbal collocates such as zgodzić się, (agree), akceptować 
(accept), przyjmować (receive), podtrzymywać (support), which 
amount to 18 occurrences. 
(36) Trybunał zgadza się z poglądem wyrażonym przez 
Prokutarora Generalnego, że w odniesieniu do pierwszego ze 
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wskazanych zarzutów analiza uzasadnienia wniosku nie 
dostarcza żadnych argumentów mogących potwierdzić 
zasadność sformułowanego zarzutu niekonstytucyjności art. 
21 ust. 1 w związku z art. 2 pkt. 5 u.e.p. [The Tribunal agrees 
with the view expressed by the Attorney General that …]. 
The other major function centres around the collocational 
pattern which include the verb wyrazić (express). This is in fact the 
most frequent single verbal collocate (52 instances / 21.5%). 
(37) Marszałek Sejmu wyraził jednak pogląd, że obecnie 
obowiązujący w Polsce model środków zaskarżenia przyjęty 
w wykonaniu Rozporządzenia nr 44/2001 jest zgodny z 
Konstytucją. [The Speaker expressed the view that (…)]. 
(38) Wnioskodawca wyraził pogląd, że zaskarżony przepis 
godzi także w zasadę nullum delictum sine lege certa. [The 
Petitioner expressed the view that (…)]. 
As examples 37 and 38 show, the phrase pogląd, że is used to 
report on how the interactants’ are positioned with regard to a given 
legal issue. In terms of the textual structure of legal justification, this 
reporting use is commonly found in either the historical part or the 
part „at the trial”. This part of the justification serves to present the 
arguments of the parties to the proceedings and it precedes the 
argumentation of the Tribunal. In each case, the legal interactant is 
identified. Interestingly, there are also many cases where views are 
ascribed less directly. 
(39) W filozofii oraz piśmiennictwie prawniczym 
zakorzeniony jest pogląd, że przesłanka „moralności” odsyła 
do norm moralnych uznanych w danym społeczeństwie i 
odnoszących się do stosunków międzyludzkich. [In 
philosophy and legal writing, there is a deeply-rooted view 
that …] 
(40) W judykaturze ETPC utrwalony jest pogląd, że prawo 
do sądu byłoby iluzoryczne, gdyby wewnętrzny system prawa 
państwa umożliwiał to, iż prawomocne orzeczenie jest 
nieskuteczne ze szkodą dla jednej ze stron. [In the judicature 
of the ECHR, there is a long-standing view that …]. 
Other similar lexical items include the dominuje (dominate), 
przeważa, panuje (prevail) which account for 8% of the cases. 
Overall, this use of pogląd, że is very common (almost 30% of the 
cases) and it serves to indicate the existence of views, esp. those 
present in legal literature, the legal doctrine or the judicature (usually 
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of the Constitutional Tribunal). It could be argued that the examples 
provided above are not totally deprived of an evaluative value. If a 
view prevails then this gives an additional authority.  
Finally, there are relatively few cases when pogląd, że is used 
to overtly evaluate a particular proposition (6% of the cases): 
(41) Tym samym, niezasadny byłby pogląd, że 
kwestionowana regulacja prowadzi do naruszenia 
konstytucyjnego zakazu podwójnej karalności. [the view that 
(…) would be unjustified]. 
(42) Trybunał stwierdził, że zbyt daleko idący byłby 
pogląd, że Konstytucja ograniczyła swoją normatywną treść 
tylko do nałożenia na ustawodawcę obowiązku przyjęcia 
przepisów w tej dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa i higieny pracy. 
The Tribunal said that the view that (….) would go too far]. 
 
notion that and twierdzenie, że 
Finally, two nouns are examined which are not semantically 
equivalent but they display a very high degree of functional similarity. 
The Polish noun twierdzenie corresponds to the English claim or 
assertion. Both these nouns belong to the linguistic repertoire of 
argumentative language. These two nouns are similar in that 
evaluation is the dominant discourse function. Below, their 
phraseological behaviour is briefly examined. The noun notion when 
followed by the that-clause is relatively infrequent in the corpus of 
S.C. opinions. Still, its rounded frequency of 27 occurrences per one 
milion words is largely on a par with its freqency in the COCA (24.2). 
The analysis shows that evaluation is the dominant discourse function 
as it accounts for as much as 64% of all the instances of this phrase 
found in the corpus. In the remaining cases, notions signal causal 
relations (21%) and confirmation (15%). The closer scrutiny of the co-
texts in which notion that is found shows that the phrase notion is the 
preferred way of expressing unfavourable and unmitgated evaluation, 
esp. when the phrase is found in the subject position: 
(43) The notion that media corporations have 
constitutional entitlement to accelerated judicial review of the 
denial of zoning variances is absurd. 
(44) The notion that FIFRA contains a nonambiguous 
command to pre-empt the types of tort claims that paralel 
FIFRA’s misbranding requirements is particularly dubious 
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given that just five years ago the United States advocated the 
interpretation that we adopt today. 
Notions are also confirmed or disconfirmed as in the 
following example (45) which signals a lack of support from Justice 
Ginsburg, who delivered the opinion of the Court. It is worth pointing 
out that while the notion itself is not evaluated, the proposition 
contained in the that-clause achieves a clearly evaluative effect by 
using the negatively-charged verb scavenge to imply that the 
defendant could experience difficulty in obtaining access to some 
evidence related to the case: 
(45) Our decisions lend no support to the notion that 
defendant must scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady 
material when the prosecution represents that all such material 
has been disclosed. 
Notions are also frequently rejected or discounted. Notions 
may also be the basis for other propositions some of which signal 
contention: 
(46) The contention is premised on the notion that the 
phrase ”original jurisdiction of all civil actions”means 
different things in par. 1331 and par. 1332. 
The Polish phrase twierdzenie, że is found 66 times in the 
Tribunal’s judgments. The analysis shows that in 77% of all the 
instances, it co-occurs with language items which are either explicitly 
evaluative by directly qualifying the noun twierdzenie or which 
indicate stance by signalling (dis)agreement with claims made by 
other interactants. The following adjectives and phrases have beed 
indentified as most common in the first case, niedopuszczalne, 
nieprawidłowe, nieuprawnione, nieuzsadnione, trafne, zbyt daleko 
idące, nie znajduje (konstytucyjnego) uzasadnienia. These are 
illustrated in Example 47 and 48. 
(47) Nieuprawnione jest także twierdzenie Ministra 
Sprawiedliwości, że ustawową podstawą do przetwarzania 
przez kuratora danych, o których mowa (…) [Unjustified is 
the claim made by the Justice Minister that (…). 
(48) Skoro ustawa o świadczeniach rodzinnych nie 
rozstrzyga, na które kolejne niepełnosprawne dziecko w 
rodzinie przysługuje kwota zwiększenia dodatku z tytułu 
samotnego wychowywania dziecka, nieprawidłowe jest 
twierdzenie Rzecznika, że art. 11a ust. 4 ustawy narusza art. 
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69 Konstytucji [(…) incorrect is the claim put forward by the 
Ombudsman that (…)]. 
As in the case of the other nouns discussed above, stance is 
also expressed by indicating one’s agreement or disagreement. This is 
usually realized using the modal verb móc plus negation: nie można: 
(49) Nie można zgodzić się z twierdzeniem wnioskodawcy, 
że kwestionowany przepis nakłada na kuratora sądowego 
(…); [One cannot agree with the Petitioner’s claim that…]. 
Another preferred way of challenging assertions is to indicate 
that it does not deserve support: 
(50) Z uwagi na powyższe nie zasługuje na poparcie 
twierdzenie, że w społeczeństwie polskim bezwzględny 
zakaz uboju rytualnego jest konieczny do ochrony szeroko 
rozumianej moralności. [the claim that … does not deserve 
support]. 
(51) Na aprobatę nie zasługuje również pogląd odwołujący 
się do zasady swobody umów, a także twierdzenie, że 
przyjęte przez ustawodawcę rozwiązanie korzystnie wpływa 
na cenę gruntu podczas jego sprzedaży. [the claim that (…) 
does not deserve approval. 
One more phraseologically distinct pattern includes the forms 
uzasadniać / uzasadnienie (justify / justification) co-occurring with 
twierdzenie, że: 
(52) Nie ma zatem konstytucyjnego uzasadnienia 
twierdzenie, że (…) [There is no constitutional justification 
for the claim that …]. 
(53) W tej sytuacji zaniechanie wyrażenia opinii przez 
podmiot uprawniony nie może uzasadniać twierdzenia, że 
(…) [In this case, failure to express opinion by an entitled 
entitiy cannot justify the claim that …]. 
These examples illustrate the semantic and functional 
regularity that this pattern is primarily used to express negative stance. 
Only one counter-example was found. This brief analysis shows that 
twierdzenie, że belongs to the repertoire of challenging propositions in 
legal argumentation. 
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
Legal justification is central to judicial decision-making 
irrespective of a legal system. While justification may play different 
roles in different legal systems, it invariably reflects the motives 
behind judicial decisions and judges’ way of reasoning. Arguments of 
various legal interactants are presented and carefully examined to 
check the status and validity of claims made by applicants.  
The findings presented in this paper corroborate the claim that 
evaluative language is inherent in legal reasoning and argumentation 
and they provide further evidence that judges tend to favour certain 
linguistic expressions to make assessments and express their stances. 
One such linguistic resource is provided by head nouns which take a 
nominal complement in the form of a that-clause. While only a limited 
number of nouns have been taken into account in this study, the 
findings, based on bilingual data, unequivocally show that this 
grammar pattern tends to be associated with evaluative meanings. 
Evaluation accounts for the largest proportions of instances where 
each of the nouns is used in the data (except for assumption and its 
Polish counterpart założenie). Clearly, there are other discourse 
functions peformed by these phrases, such as indicating casual 
relations, existence or confirmation but evaluation remains the 
dominant one. Challenged propositions in legal argumentation are 
likely to be labelled as arguments, assumptions, notions or views. This 
discursive practice seems to hold true in both American and Polish 
judicial discourse. These findings help to identify ‘sites of 
contentions’, i.e. textual spaces where judges express their 
(dis)agreements over specific points of law. The corpus-based 
functional analysis helps to reveal the general phraseological 
similarity between the two sets of data suggesting that American and 
Polish judicial writing is underpinned by essentially the same 
epistemological assumptions. Irrespective of the differences between 
the two legal cultures and their major judicial institutions, there are 
certain patterns of linguistic expression exploited in judicial rhetoric 
for basically the same reasons. On the other hand, there are some 
differences in the way the nouns behave phraseologically. Polish 
nouns tend to show less collocational variation and they are found 
performing fewer discourse functions. For example, the noun pogląd 
co-occurs with only two verbal collocates (podzielać and wyrazić) in 
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as much as 40% of the cases. The Polish argument is associated with 
two discourse functions: evaluation and existence, while its American 
equivalent co-occurs with four different functions.  
This study is obviously limited in some respects. It considers 
only a small proportion of nouns and it focuses on a single pattern, 
where the noun is followed by the that-clause. One immediate way of 
extending the analysis is to examine a larger set of nouns in their 
entire complementation patterns. The other research direction could 
focus on identifying other common structures and phraseologies 
employed by judges in their justifications with a view to building a 
picture of common epistemological practices in judicial discourse 
across different legal cultures and languages. 
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